Japan and many other European countries across the world have discontinued the use of EVMs

EVMs with in-built memory versus ones with detachable memory module (DMM) which are very easy to doctor
	How difficult is it to tamper votes stored in Electronic Voting Machines (EVM)? Not very, it seems according to the response of an application filed under the Right to Information Act (RTI) by Pune, India -based social activist. In fact, if you were to tamper with votes, one of your best options would be an EVM. A scandalous fact that was brought to the fore by Rekha Gore’s RTI is that Maharashtra is one of the few states in the country which uses Electronic Voting Machines with detachable memory modules (DMM) for municipal elections. The DMM is a small part of the EVM which contains election results. But it is detachable from the machine. So, it is risky as the election result can be destroyed, tampered with or even replaced. So, the results can be very easily manipulated by replacing the DMM. After the elections, EVMs are stored under high security, even candidates are not allowed onto the premises to check if transparency is being maintained, which actually should be their right. Japan and many other European countries across the world have discontinued the use of EVMs. In America, EVMs have been heavily criticised and now, states give states the option of using ballot boxes or EVMs.” Opposition Party national secretary, who has taken up this issue with the election commision, said, “When almost all the states in India are using EVMs with inbuilt memory for municipal elections, why does the Maharastra election commission use EVMs with DMM. By doing this, they are not being transparent and creating a scope for manipulation. The Election Commission is ready to provide EVMs with inbuilt memory to Maharashtra, why then are we shying from accepting them. I have taken up this issue with the election commission.” It is said that the EVM technology used in India has been discarded in many countries around the world as it was criticised by political parties all over. Then why in India, is the election commission is using age-old technology when 21st century technology like EVMs with paper back ups are available. Gore filed an application with the state election commission which revealed that the commission bought 31,800 EVMs from Electronics’ Corporation of India Limited for Rs 10,900 each. The machines were bought between October 2004 and February 2007. These EVMs are used in Municipal Corporation, municipal council, Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti and Gram Panchayat elections. Maharasthra Pradesh Congress Committee vice president, said, “The introduction of EVMs has brought a sea change in the way elections are conducted in the country. However, if there is some fault with the machines, it must be looked into.”
	Why the rage against this machine EVMs used in the state have memory modules that can be detached. This means anyone who wishes to manipulate election results simply has to replace the chip (DMM) in the machine. Though EVMs with inbuilt memory can be compromised too, it requires a computer expert to tamper with the data Vetoed around the world • Ireland abandoned e-voting in 2006 • In April 2004, California banned 14,000 EVMs • In Germany, EVMs were declared unconstitutional in March 2009 • In the Netherlands, in 2006, licenses of 1,187 EVMs were withdrawn after citizen group ‘We do not trust voting machines’ showed they could hack into EVMs in 5 minutes from up to 40 metres without the knowledge of voters or election officials • Supreme Court of Finland declared the result of pilot electronic voting machines invalid in the municipal corporation elections of 2009 EVM Hacked!Electronic Voting Machines can be tampered with, and a team of experts have demonstrated exactly how it can be done! Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) are easy to hack into. There is proof. Team of researchers used a machine from the state to demonstrate two ways in which the results could have been rigged. Researchers, showed precisely how a display component could be replaced with a fake substitute programmed to steal a percentage of the votes in favour of a chosen candidate. They also exposed how stored votes could be changed between the election and the public counting session, which in say, in India, can be weeks later, with a pocket-sized device. The team, comprising Hyderabad-based NetIndia, Dr J Alex Halderman, professor & noted expert on electronic voting security from the University of Michigan and Holland-based security expert Rop Gonggrijp, was instrumental in the ban on EVMs in the Netherlands. NetIndia Managing Director had earlier demonstrated how the instrument could be tampered with, but could prove this only theoretically as Election Commission did not provide him with a real EVM. “This time, we got hold of real EVM,” said Prasad. He was vocal about the vulnerability of EVMs even as the chief election commission vouched for their ‘infallibility’. Indian EVMs record votes only onto the internal memory of the system. There are no paper records that allow for inspection or recount. In fact, the vote-counting software in the EVMs is programmed to not allow the software to be read out and verified. “Since these chips are made in the US and Japan, this has led to a situation where nobody in India knows for sure what software is in these machines or whether it counts votes accurately,” reads the report. Attack One! A small display component of the machine can be replaced with an identical component. This component can be programmed to steal a percentage of the votes in favour of a chosen candidate. Signals to activate the program can be transmitted from by using a mere mobile phone. Result of voting is displayed on LED segments. There's a 3-mm gap between segments. That's where a chip can be loaded. This chip can be connected wireless to mobile phone." If a miscreant manages to place a chip, a signal from a micro-controller will control what is displayed on the screen. Attack Two! Votes stored in the EVM between the election and the public counting session can be changed by using a specially made pocket-sized device. When you open the machine, you find micro-controllers, under which are electrically enabled programs, with ‘read-only’ memory. It is used only for storage. However, Prasad warns, “You can read and write memory from an external interface. We have developed a small clip with a chip on the top to read votes inside the memory and manipulate the data by swapping the vote from one candidate to another.” Reasoning the need to demonstrate he says, “We are not questioning the system of checks and balances. Our intention is only to highlight that EVMs are vulnerable and have even been banned in countries like the Netherlands.” Maharashtra State Chief Electoral Officer said he was aware of the issue. “We know that such claims are being made. It is a matter of inspection. We will decide what is to be done after investigations.”
	(L-R) J Alex Halderman, Hari K Prasad, and Rop Gonggrijp, holding the EVM
	Clip-on device ‘steals’ votes from EVMs.
	Control unit displays vote totals for a candidate at the end of an election. This can be easily tampered with, researchers show
	Voters use this ballot unit by pressing the button corresponding to the candidate they want to vote for
	The display in the EVM can be replaced with a look-alike (above). Parts were hidden under the LEDs, that substitute dishonest vote totals when showing election results
	Application that runs on an Android phone wirelessly tells the fake display which candidate should get stolen votes
	Demonstration attack device was also developed. It clips on to the memory chips inside the EVM and steals votes
	A close-up of clip-on vote stealing attack device. A rotary switch (top) allows the hacker to select which candidate to favour
	Processor in the EVM is designed so that election software is hard to read out. Officials claim this is a security feature, but it makes it difficult for them to verify that the correct software is in the EVMs
	Frames from an official poll worker instruction video show how control unit is sealed with red wax & string (top). The seals protecting the screw holes on the case consist of printed paper stickers (bottom). Such seals could be easily faked and provide an extremely weak defence
	Inside the EVM is a main circuit board with the CPU and vote memory. It also has a smaller display board